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PARTIES 
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Appellant's Brief shows Amanda Harvey as Plaintiff/Appellant. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-2-2(3)(k), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)(j). Judge Noel's Order granting summary judgment 
was entered on March 6, 1997. (R. 67-68). Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on March 
19, 1997. (R. 69-72). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on or about June 2, 1997. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). On 
appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court resolves only legal issues, determines 
whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and determines whether the trial 
court correctly held that no genuine issue of fact was in dispute. Weese v. Davis County 
Comm'n. 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issue is presented for review: 
ISSUE I: Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the rights and obligations 
of Rear River and the Harveys were fixed at a date not later than the date of the Amanda 
Harvey's accident for the purpose of applying Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(6), which 
prohibits stacking underinsured motorist benefits. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(6). 
2. Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B). 
3. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3. 
4. Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 25. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case arises from a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance benefits. On 
August 14, 1993, Amanda Harvey was injured in an automobile accident while she was a 
passenger in an automobile driven by Kyle Schwartz, who was insured by Allstate Insurance 
Company. The accident involved a second vehicle driven by Wally Vickers. Vickers's vehicle 
was insured by Prudential Insurance Company. Amanda Harvey's father, Stephen E. Harvey, 
was insured through Bear River for auto insurance which included underinsured motorist 
coverage. 
Amanda has received the entire amount of Allstate's liability coverage for its driver 
Kyle Schwartz in the sum of $100,000. Amanda has also received $80,000 from Prudential to 
settle the liability of Wally Vickers. 
Amanda has also received the entire amount of the Allstate UIM coverage, $10,000, 
which she was entitled to receive under the law which existed at the time of her injury. What 
she has not received—and her claim in this action—is for another (second) UIM limit of 
$10,000 from Bear River, which had issued its policy to Amanda's parents. 
At the time Bear River issued its policy, and at the time of Amanda's injury, Utah law 
did not allow a claim for this second UIM limit (stacking) against Bear River. Two years 
later, effective May 1, 1995, the Utah Legislature changed the law to allow stacking. 
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Still later, in January and February, 1996, Amanda's lawyers got around to finalizing 
her settlement with Allstate based on the negligence of its insured, Kyle Schwartz. At that 
time, Allstate also paid its UIM limit of $10,000. 
Stephen E. Harvey, general guardian of his minor daughter, filed this action against 
Bear River claiming that Amanda Harvey was entitled to UIM benefits from Bear River in 
addition to the UIM benefits Amanda received from Allstate Insurance Company. The Harveys 
claim that they are entitled to the benefit of the 1995 change in the law. The District Court 
granted Bear River's motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
After the parties conducted discovery, Bear River moved for summary judgment 
because the law at the time of Amanda's injury, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(b)(1993), 
did not allow for stacking of underinsured motorist coverage and because application of the 
stacking amendment to Amanda Harvey's claim would infringe upon Bear River's 
constitutional right to freedom from impairment of contract. 
The motion was briefed by the parties and subsequently submitted for decision to Judge 
Frank G. Noel on February 11, 1997. On March 6, 1997, Judge Noel granted Bear River's 
motion for summary judgment. The trial court stated the reasons for its decision as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion the parties' rights and obligations under the 
insurance contract are fixed at a date no later than the date of the accident, and 
accordingly for plaintiff to prevail the statutory amendment would have to apply 
retroactively. Under the facts of this case the amendment in question cannot be 
applied retroactively inasmuch as the substantive rights of the parties are 
involved and the language of the amendment does not expressly provide for 
retroactivity. 
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(R.65). A full copy of Judge Noel's ruling is attached as Addendum "A." Judge Noel's Order 
granting summary judgment was entered on March 6, 1997. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
summary judgment in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Steven Harvey, father of Amanda Harvey, was insured through Bear River 
Insurance Company for automobile insurance, which included UIM coverage. The policy 
period was June 24, 1993, to December 24, 1993. (R.62). 
2. On August 14, 1993, Amanda Harvey was a passenger in an automobile driven 
by Kyle Schwartz, who was insured by Allstate Insurance Company. On that date, Amanda 
Harvey was injured in an automobile accident. (R.l). 
3. The accident involved a second vehicle driven by Wally Vickers. Vickers's 
vehicle was insured by Prudential Insurance Company. (R.19). 
4. Allstate paid $100,000 to settle the liability of Kyle Schwartz for the claims of 
Amanda Harvey. Prudential paid $80,000 to settle the liability of Wally Vickers for the claims 
of Amanda Harvey. (R.2). 
5. The Allstate policy and the Bear River policy each provided UIM coverage with 
limits of $10,000, which was the minimum coverage provided by statute as of that date. 
(R.19). 
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6. Allstate Insurance paid its full limits of UIM coverage in the amount of $10,000 
to the Harveys or on behalf of Amanda Harvey. (R. 19). 
7, As of the date of the accident, August 14, 1993, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
305(10)(b), provided: 
The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. 
(R.33-35). A copy is attached to this brief as Addendum "B." 
9. The Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305, effective May 1, 
1995, to provide that a covered person injured while occupying a vehicle may recover 
underinsured motorist benefits under a policy covering a vehicle for which the injured person 
is an insured family member in addition to recovering benefits under the policy covering the 
vehicle that the person occupied at the time of the accident. The specific provision of the 1995 
amendment which allows for stacking is Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B). (R.36-
37). A copy is attached to this brief as Addendum "C." 
10. The 1995 amendment contains no express provision concerning retroactivity or 
the effective date of the change. (R.36-37). 
11. Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 25, provides that an Act shall not take 
effect until sixty days after the adjournment of the session of the Legislature at which the Act 
was passed. 
12. Sixty days after the adjournment of the session, in which the 1995 amendment 
to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 was passed, was May 1, 1995. (R.36). 
5 
13. The Bear River policy does not provide the stacked UIM benefit the Harveys 
seek. The policy provides for non-duplication of UIM benefits in clear and unambiguous 
terms. (R.61). A copy of Bear River's policy including the Cover and Part C2 is attached as 
Addendum "D." 
14. The Harveys claim that the 1995 amendment allowing stacking applies to their 
claim for UIM benefits against Bear River because the Bear River policy provides that there is 
no UIM coverage until the limits of liability coverage have been used up; and Allstate did not 
pay its liability coverage until after the date of the 1995 amendment. (R.l-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I, Summary judgment was correctly granted to Bear River on the issue of the non-
applicability of the 1995 Amendment to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305, which allows stacking 
of underinsured motorist coverage. (R.65-68). The amendment was enacted after the date of 
the accident and contains no express provision concerning retroactivity. Additionally, 
application of the amendment would affect the parties' substantive rights and should not be 
applied retroactively. 
POINT II. Bear River maintains that the Harveys' claim for underinsured motorist benefits 
arose on the date of the accident. This position is supported by Utah law and the plain 
language of Bear River's auto insurance policy. The auto insurance policy also clearly states 
that duplication of underinsured motorist benefits is not allowed. 
POINT III. The language of Bear River's auto insurance policy is plain and unambiguous. 
The Harveys cannot create ambiguity by assigning a different meaning to the terms of the 
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underinsured motorist coverage in accordance with their own interests. The terms contained in 
the provision are clear, do not omit any terms, and cannot be understood to have more than 
one plausible meaning. 
POINT IV, Application of the amendment which allows stacking of UIM coverage to the 
Harveys' claim would infringe upon Bear River's constitutional right to freedom from 
impairment of contract because Bear River had a right to rely on the statute which prohibited 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO BEAR RIVER BECAUSE THE APPLICABLE STATUTE, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(10)(6), DOES NOT ALLOW FOR STACKING 
OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS. 
The Harveys may not stack the UIM coverage in Bear River's policy and the $10,000 
of UIM benefits from the Allstate policy, which the Harveys have already received. At the 
time of Amanda's accident on August 14, 1993, the law provided "[t]he limit of liability for 
underinsured motorist coverage for two or more vehicles may not be added together, 
combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(b) (1993) (effective May 3, 
1993). 
In 1995, the Utah legislature amended Section 31A-22-305 to allow stacking of 
underinsured motorist coverage for a covered person who is "injured while occupying or using 
a motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered 
person, the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative." I(L, 
§31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) (1995) (effective May 1, 1995). Covered persons are defined as 
"persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are 
residents of the named insured's household . . . ." KL, § 31A-22-305(l)(b) (1994 & Supp. 
1996). 
The Harveys claim that the right to underinsured motorist benefits did not arise until 
Allstate paid its insured's underinsured motorist coverage in February, 1996. However, this 
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position is contrary to well settled law. The substantive law defining the parties' relationship 
should be determined as of the time of the accident. Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952, 
954 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Park Citv Corp.. 397 F. 
Supp. 411, 414-15 (D. Ore. 1973)); Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208, 
210 (Utah 1974) (stating that a party "is entitled to have its rights determined on the basis of 
the law as it existed at the time of the occurrence . . . . " ) . Under the above rules, the Harveys' 
claim for UIM benefits is determined based on the law existing on the date of the accident, 
August 14, 1993. 
Application of the stacking amendment, which was enacted after the accident, would 
allow the Harveys to claim an additional $10,000 in underinsured motorist coverage from Bear 
River. "A later statute or amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to deprive 
a party of his rights or impose greater liability upon him." Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake 
City. 784 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989) (quoting Okland Construction Co.. 520 P.2d 208, 210 
(Utah 1974)). Application of the stacking amendment would impose upon Bear River greater 
liability than under the law that was in effect at the time of the accident and greater liability 
then the parties contracted for. Therefore, the stacking amendment should not be applied in 
this case. 
The general rule in Utah declares that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1993). Since the Utah legislature did 
not expressly make the 1995 amendment retroactive, the rule dictates that the 1995 amendment 
allowing for stacking of insurance coverage should not apply to Amanda's accident, which 
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occurred approximately a year-and-a-half before the amendment's passage. Moreover, this 
case does not fall under the exception to the general rule, which applies: 
where a statute changes only procedural law by providing a different mode or 
form of procedure for enforcing substantive rights. Such remedial statutes are 
generally applied retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the 
Legislature's remedial purpose. . . . [Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to 
the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and 
pending actions as well. 
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs.. 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah App. 1990) 
(quoting Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added)). The narrow procedural exception has been applied in few instances where "the 
change [has] only affect[ed] the judicial machinery for enforcing substantive rights or where 
the change simply clarified the legislature's previous intent." Id.at 668, n.5. Utah courts have 
usually found that statutory changes have affected substantive rights and have refused to apply 
the statutes retroactively. IcL at 668, n.6 (citing examples of such cases). 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a substantive change in the law: 
as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of 
the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action, as distinguished from 
adjective law which pertains to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the 
legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective. 
Id, at 669 (quoting Petty v. Clark. 192 P.2d 589, 593-94 (1948)). Generally speaking, "[if] a 
statutory amendment changes the contractual rights and obligations of the parties, it is 
substantive." Id, (citing Petty. 192 P.2d at 593). Specifically, "[a] change in a statutory 
remedy or defense is a substantive change if it affects the rights and duties of the parties." l±_ 
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In Washington National v. Sherwood Assocs.. a debtor assumed the obligations under a 
$1.2 million note secured by a trust deed. Id. at 666. At the time of the debtor's purchase, 
Utah law provided that a debtor could cure any default and avoid foreclosure by paying the 
amount in default under the note at any time prior to foreclosure. Id. Subsequently, the 
legislature amended the law governing judicial foreclosures to eliminate a debtor's right to 
cure by paying the amount in default. Id. at 666-67. 
Several years after the amendment took effect, the debtor ceased making payments on 
the note, and the creditor insurance company accelerated the note pursuant to its contractual 
rights. Id at 666. The debtor attempted to cure by paying the amount in default, citing the 
pre-amendment version of the statute. Id. at 667. The creditor rejected the debtor's tender, 
arguing that the current version of the statute applied and that the debtor was required to pay 
the entire amount of the debt in order to cure. IcL 
Holding that the original statute applied, which allowed the debtor to pay the amount of 
default in order to cure, the court determined that the legislature had not expressly made the 
amended statute retroactive. IcL Next, the court inquired into whether the change in the 
judicial foreclosure law was substantive or procedural "with the premise that a contract 
implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered." IcL at 669. The court held that 
the amendment was substantive because it eliminated the debtor's right to cure a default under 
the note and trust deed by paying only the amount of default rather than the entire amount 
owed. Id at 670. Such a change altered the meaning of the debtor's contract and deprived him 
of a contractual right due him under the prior statutory scheme. Id. Since the legislature had 
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not made the amended statute expressly retroactive and since the amendment affected the 
debtor's substantive contractual rights, the court held that the original statute governed. I i . 
In reaching its conclusion, the Washington National court cited other Utah cases that 
reached similar results. In Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, for instance, a couple who were 
passengers in another person's car were involved in a collision with an automobile driven by a 
deputy sheriff. 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976). The husband sought damages for his injuries and 
for the wrongful death of his wife, who was killed in the accident. Id,.The county filed a third-
party complaint against the driver of the car in which the couple was riding, alleging that he 
had been driving under the influence of alcohol. IcL The county sought contribution from the 
driver as a joint tort-feasor pursuant to a statute that had become effective less than a month 
after the accident. Id, Prior to the statute's adoption, Utah law did not recognize any right of 
contribution between joint tort-feasors. Id^ 
In considering whether the contribution statute was applicable, the court stated that 
"[t]he statute . . . [did] in fact create a right of action where none existed prior to its 
adoption," thus indicating a substantive change in the law. Id. Consequently, the court held 
that "[t]he contribution statute established a primary right and duty which was not in existence 
at the time the injuries in th[e] case arose, and the statute not being retroactive by its terms did 
not create a right on behalf of the" county. IdL The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of 
the third-party complaint. IcL 
Similarly, in Stephens v. Henderson, also cited by the Washington National court, a 
woman who was roller skating injured her wrist when she was tripped by an unknown skater. 
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741 P.2d at 953. The woman sued the skating center and the unknown "John Doe" skater. l±_ 
The skating center sought to have the Liability Reform Act, which had become effective a 
year-and-a-half after the woman's accident, applied to the case. IcL 
In considering whether to apply the Liability Reform Act, the court noted that the 
legislature had not specifically made the Act retroactive. Id,, at 954. The court also determined 
that the Act "redefme[d] the relationship between the plaintiff and the joint tort-feasors . . . 
and chang[ed] the substantive law in effect when [the woman] !s cause of action arose . . . ." 
Id. The court concluded that the Act could not be applied retroactively in the absence of an 
express legislative direction. IcL Consequently, the skating center was liable for the full 
amount of the woman's damages under the original statute. IcL 
As in Washington National. Brunyer, and Stephens, the 1995 amendment to Section 
31A-22-305 of the Utah Code allowing for stacking of underinsured motorist coverage effected 
a substantive change in the law. In particular, the 1995 amendment created a new substantive 
right of the insured to recover additional money from the insurer through the stacking of 
underinsured motorist coverage. Thus, the 1995 amendment represents a change in the 
substantive law because it alters the rights and duties of the insured and the insurer by 
exposing the insurer to additional liability not contemplated at the time the insurance policy 
was issued. 
Therefore, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision to grant Bear River's 
motion for summary judgment because the statute effective on the date of the accident, Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(b), which prohibits stacking of uninsured motorist coverage, 
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applies to Appellant's claim, and Allstate has discharged all underinsured motorist benefit 
obligations by paying its policy limits. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED BEAR RIVER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE HARVEYS' 
CLAIM TO UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS AROSE ON THE 
DATE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
A. Utah case law supports Bear River's position that the claim for underinsured motorist 
coverage arose on the date of an accident. 
A party's rights and obligations under an insurance policy vest on the date of the 
accident or occurrence. See, Stephens. 741 P.2d 952; Okland Constr. Co.. 520 P.2d 208; 
Wulfenstein v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Assoc. 611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980). 
In Wulfenstein. a worker that had been terminated from her employment brought a 
claim against her employer's insurer to recover medical expense benefits for expenses she 
incurred after being terminated. The worker argued that she was covered under the employer's 
medical expense policy because her medical expenses arose out of an accident that occurred 
during her employment. The court denied the worker's claim for medical expense benefits and 
stated: 
Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or 
allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk 
contingencies. (Citation omitted.) The policy involved here could have been an 
accident or sickness policy in which case, the risk insured against would have 
been an accident or illness, and rights to any claims arising therefrom would 
have vested at the time of the accident or illness. 
Id. at 361. The Wulfenstein court points out that if the worker had been covered under an 
accident policy, the right to any claim arising from such policy would have vested at the time 
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of the accident. Bear River's policy was an accident policy that insured against risks of 
automobile accidents. Therefore, the Harveys' right to UIM benefits under Bear River's 
insurance policy vested at the time of the accident, not when Allstate paid or settled its liability 
coverage. 
The Harveys rely on Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commis.. 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 
1986). In Carlucci. the court held that the wife of a deceased worker could make a claim for 
benefits against the Default Indemnity Fund which was established approximately five months 
after the death of the worker. The court came to this decision by applying the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act and law specifically applicable in a workers' compensation context. The 
court explained that the worker's wife's claim for workers' compensation was separate and 
different from the worker's claim for compensation. In that particular context, the court found 
that the deceased worker's wife's claims arose when the worker's employer became unable to 
discharge its workers' compensation liability. In addition, the decision was consistent with a 
provision of the Default Indemnity Fund Act in Utah Code Ann. §35-l-107(l)(1953) 
(recodified as Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-704), which expressly provides that liability of the 
Indemnity Fund arises "when an employer becomes insolvent, has appointed a receiver, or 
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to cover 
workers' compensation liabilities under this chapter." 
Carlucci involved a situation where the Utah legislature had specifically determined the 
time when the Default Indemnity Fund became liable to cover workers' compensation claims. 
The Harveys would have the Court, by analogy, apply the same statutory time limit to their 
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case. However, unlike the statute in Carlucci which fixed the date of Indemnity Fund liability, 
there is no statute in the instant case that sets the date upon which an insurer becomes liable 
for payment of underinsured motorist benefits. Utah case law already provides that such 
liability arises on the date of the accident. The Harveys would have the Court apply a faulty 
analogy instead of applying Utah case law that is directly on point. At pointed out earlier, 
"[t]he substantive law defining the parties' relationship should be determined at the time of the 
accident." Stephens. 741 P.2d at 954; Okland Construction Co.. 520 P.2d at 210. 
B. Bear River's auto insurance policy clearly states that underinsured motorist benefits 
arise from the time of the accident and that claims for underinsured motorist coverage 
may not be added together, combined or stacked to determine insurance coverage. 
Bear River's position that claims for UIM coverage arise at the time of the accident is 
also supported by the plain language of Bear River's auto policy, which provides in Part C2-
Underinsured Motorist Coverage: 
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered person, as defined 
in this part is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or 
death: 
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and 
2. caused by an accident. 
(emphasis supplied). Under the terms of the insurance policy, any claim the Harveys might 
make for UIM benefits arose upon the happening of an accident. 
The insurance policy also provides that duplication of underinsured benefits is not 
allowed. On page 12, the policy states that "[t]he limits of liability for underinsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident." 
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A copy of Bear River's policy, Part C2- Underinsured Motorist Coverage, is attached as 
Addendum "D." 
The Harveys ask the Court to add a benefit to the insurance contract which the contract 
expressly denies. Doing so would conflict with the well established rule that courts "will not 
enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself." Rio Algom Corp. v. 
JimcoLtd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). Nor will a court make a better contract for the 
parties than they have made for themselves. Id. 
POINT III 
BEAR RIVER'S AUTO INSURANCE POLICY IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THE HARVEYS MAY NOT CREATE 
AMBIGUITY BY SIMPLY ASSIGNING A DIFFERENT MEANING TO 
THE POLICY THAT FAVORS THEIR INTERESTS. 
The Harveys assert that the policy language is ambiguous and therefore must be 
construed in favor of payment of the underinsured motorist coverage benefits. The policy 
provision in question states: "[t]here is no coverage until the limits of liability of all bodily 
injury liability bonds and policies that apply have been used up by payment of judgments or 
settlements to other persons." Bear River policy, p. 11. Attached as Addendum "D." 
The Harveys interpret the provision to mean that the claim for UIM benefits against 
Bear River could not arise until Allstate settled or paid its uninsured motorist obligations. Bear 
River maintains that their claim arose out of the accident on August 14, 1993. 
Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language presents a question of law to 
be decided by using accepted methods of construction. Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665 
(Utah 1992). A policy term is not ambiguous merely because one party assigns a different 
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meaning to it in accordance with his or her own interests. Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit 
Assoc. 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah App. 1990). However, contract language may be ambiguous if 
it is unclear or omits terms used to express the intention of the parties that may be understood 
to have two or more plausible meanings. Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976, 
977 (Utah App. 1989). When a contract is clear and unambiguous, a court will not modify a 
contract or create an ambiguity where none existed before. See e.g., Public Utility Dist No. 1 
of Klickitat County v. International Ins. Co.. 881 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 1994). Although liberal 
interpretations are often afforded the insured in insurance contracts, "[i]t is not the function of 
the court to rewrite an unambiguous contract." Crowther v. Carter. 767 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah 
App. 19S9)(citing Provo Citv Corp. V. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979)). 
The policy language in the Underinsured Motorist Coverage section of Bear River's 
auto policy provides that there is no underinsured motorist coverage until the applicable 
liability limits are exhausted. The language is not unclear, nor does its omit any terms. In fact 
the provision used by Bear River is very similar to the language used by the American 
insurance industry's standard personal auto insurance policies. See, I, Miller's Standard 
Insurance Policies Annotated, p. 8, (1996). The similar provision in Miller's, reads: 
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any 
applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by 
payment of judgments or settlements. 
Such language is standard throughout the insurance industry to guarantee that 
underinsured coverage be applied for its intended purpose, and not as a substitute for liability 
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coverage. "The terms of insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be interpreted in 
accordance with their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt 
to harmonize and give effect to all the contract provisions." Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d at 
665. The Court should give effect to the policy provision that prohibits stacking of UIM 
benefits. Further, the obvious purpose of the language cited by the Harveys is to require full 
payment of all liability insurance before payment of underinsured coverage benefits. 
"[U]nderinsured motorist coverage provides first party insurance protection for damages that 
exceed the limits of the tort-feasor's bodily injury coverage." U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. V. 
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). The Harveys have not referred the court to any case 
neither have they cited any rule from any jurisdiction that supports their assertion that 
coverage for UIM benefits arises only after liability limits have been paid. 
The language used in Bear River's policy in no way alters the fact that rights under the 
policy vested on the date of the accident. The policy does not provide that contract rights will 
not vest on the accident date, but rather, on some future date when the Harveys' attorneys got 
around to collecting the liability limits. Furthermore, the Harveys' interpretation would place 
in their hands the power to control the date and time when Amanda Harvey's rights would 
vest. The Harveys assert that their rights vested on the date when they went to court and 
obtained court approval for Amanda Harvey's liability claim, and when the liability proceeds 
were paid. Amanda Harvey is a minor child, so her liability claim is tolled during the period 
of her minority. Presumably, her attorneys could have waited several years before presenting 
her liability claim for payment of the Allstate policy limits covering Kyle Schwartz. It is not 
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reasonable to allow the Harveys' attorneys to control the vesting of the rights in such an 
arbitrary manner. 
The issue in this case is not whether the exclusion to underinsured motorist coverage is 
ambiguous. The language used in the policy is not ambiguous despite the Harveys' attempt to 
assign a differing meaning to the policy's clear terms. The real issue in this case is when the 
right vested to claim underinsured motorist coverage from Bear River. Utah case law and the 
plain language of the insurance policy show that the right to underinsured motorist coverage 
vested at the time of the automobile accident on August 14, 1993. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-305(10)(6), the statute in effect at the time of the accident which prohibits stacking 
of insurance coverage, controls. 
POINT IV 
APPLICATION OF THE STACKING AMENDMENT TO 
THE HARVEY'S CLAIM WOULD INFRINGE UPON BEAR 
RIVER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
FROM IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT. 
The 1995 Amendment may not be applied to the Harveys' claim without imposing a 
contractual impairment upon Bear River in violation of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. The United States Constitution provides that "[no] State shall pass . . . any . . . 
law impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. Similarly, the Utah 
Constitution provides that "[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed." 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 18. Utah has not considered whether the federal or Utah 
Constitutions would bar retroactive application of an amended statute that effected a 
substantive change in the law. See Washington National. 795 P.2d 665, 669 n.8, 670 n. 10 
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(noting that several other jurisdictions have recently found that modification of statutory 
redemption period in foreclosure statute when applied retroactively impaired obligation of 
contract in violation of contracts clause under applicable state and federal constitutions.) In a 
case similar to the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court found that application of an 
amended statute that allowed stacking of an uninsured motorist coverage to a policy issued 
prior to the effective date of the amendment violated the insurance company's constitutional 
right to be free from impairment of contract. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Gant. 478 
So.2d, 25, 27 (Fla. 1985). In Gant. a driver struck two minor children, severely injuring one 
and killing the other. Id. at 26. The children's parents had two separate State Farm insurance 
policies on their cars that prohibited any stacking of uninsured motorist coverage from both 
policies. Id. Eight days before the accident, an amended statute became effective that 
allowed insurance to stack limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Id. When State Farm paid 
the coverage limits from one policy but refused to pay any amount under the second policy, 
the parents sought a declaratory judgment that the uninsured motorist coverage would stack 
pursuant to the amendment. Id. 
In considering the issue, the court reasoned that "the amendment permitting stacking of 
uninsured motorist coverage [could not] be applied to a preexisting contract without impairing 
the obligations of that contract in violation of the Florida Constitution." W. Specifically, the 
court stated that "State Farm had a right to rely upon the anti-stacking statute in determining 
its loss exposure." Id. at 27. Thus, the court ruled that the statutory amendment allowing an 
insured to stack uninsured motorist coverage could not be applied retroactively to a policy 
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entered into before the amendment became effective where the policy contained an anti-
stacking provision. Id. 
Likewise, applying the 1995 Amendment would unconstitutionally infringe upon Bear 
River's right to be free from impairment of contract. As in Gant. Bear River had a right to 
rely upon the Utah statute that prohibited stacking of uninsured motorist coverage in 
calculating its premium and in determining its loss exposure. Permitting the application of the 
1995 Amendment would diminish Bear River's insurance contract with Amanda Harvey's 
parents in violation of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1995 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305, which allows stacking of 
underinsured motorist coverage, does not apply because the amendment is not expressly 
retroactive and it affects a substantive change in the law. The claim that the right to coverage 
under the underinsured motorist benefits did not exist until Allstate paid its applicable 
underinsured motorist benefits is not supported by the facts, by Utah case law, or by the plain 
language of the insurance policy. 
The Harvey's reliance on Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n. is misplaced because 
that case is not controlling under the applicable law or the facts present in this case. 
Furthermore, the plain language of the policy specifically denies duplicate underinsured 
motorist benefits. The policy language relating to underinsured motorist coverage and benefits 
is clear, contains all the necessary terms, and does not give rise to more than one plausible 
meaning. 
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The obvious and sensible meaning of the policy language is that in order to become a 
candidate for underinsured motorist benefits, an injured person must first collect all liability 
insurance coverage benefits. The most basic tenet of UIM coverage is that there must first be 
an exhaustion of liability coverage. Without that prerequisite, a tortfeasor cannot be 
underinsured, by definition. 
Bear River relied on the statute which prohibited stacking of UIM benefits in making 
its contract with the Harveys and determining its loss exposure. Application of the amendment 
allowing stacking of underinsured motorist benefits would violate Bear River's constitutional 
right to be free from impairment of contracts. 
Therefore, Bear River respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the 
District Court in granting Bear River's motion for summary judgment. 
Dated this 2jf"day of November, 1997. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Roger Bullock—^ 
Peter Barlow 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
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ADDENDUM A: 
JUDGE NOEL'S RULINGS ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(R. 65-68). 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Stephen E, Harvey, individually, and 




Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 
Defendant, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO: 960904572 PI 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
The court reviewed defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, together with the 
memos filed in connection with the motion and rules as follows: 
The court is of the opinion the parties' rights and obligations under the insurance contract 
are fixed at a date no later than the date of the accident, and accordingly for plaintiff to prevail 
the statutory amendment would have to be applied retroactively. Under the facts of this case 
the amendment in question cannot be applied retroactively inasmuch as substantive rights of the 
parties are involved and the language of the amendment does not expressly provide for 
retroactivity. 
Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this H / day of February, 1997. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
Z\ A /* rf\ tf> t* 
HARVEY V. BEAR RIVER PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following this .^OU day of February, 1997. 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM B: 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 31A-22-305 
(R. 33-35). 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-305 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Step-down coverage. the statutory minimums set forth in this sec-
Section 31A-22-303 does not prohibit insur- tion. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 217 Utah 
ers from providing step-down coverage for per- Adv. Rep. 13 (1993). 
missive users, as long as the coverage satisfies 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist cover-
age. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, 
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the 
policy or owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not 
covered under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing 
occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required 
by Section 31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is unin-
sured to the extent of the deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately 
caused by the vehicle operator; or 
(c) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability 
insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(c)(i) is uninsured only to 
the extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by 
a guaranty association or fund. 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) pro-
vides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
Bickness, disease, or death in limits that at least equal the minimum bodily 
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may 
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer 
that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). This 
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the 
insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liabil-
ity insurer. 
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in 
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons 
by motor vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation 
services for their students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for 
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that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, 
uninsured motorist coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 
per accident. 
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an 
injured covered person. 
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee, who is injured by 
an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is provided by Title 
35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation. 
(c) As used in this subsection: 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 
63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-
102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must 
show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing 
evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy 
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or 
replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as 
provided in Subsection (7)(b), a covered person injured in a vehicle 
described in a policy that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not 
elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor 
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered person. 
(b) The following individuals may also recover uninsured motorist 
benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered 
person" as defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor 
vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use 
of the covered person, his resident spouse, or a resident relative of the 
covered person. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a 
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a 
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has 
insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all 
special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the 
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; oi 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
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(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(c) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because 
of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in limits of at least $10,000 for 
one person in any one accident, and at least $20,000 for two or more 
persons in any one accident. 
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described 
in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). 
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability 
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but 
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of 
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the 
limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after January 1, 1993, a 
named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an 
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302 (l)(a). This rejection continues for that issuer 
of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests 
underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer. 
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal notices sent after 
January 1, 1993, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall 
notify the insured of the availability of underinsured motorist cover-
age along with estimated ranges of premiums for the coverage. The 
department shall provide standard language to be used by insurers to 
fulfill the insurers' duty under this subsection. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using 
a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the 
motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if 
the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered 
under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (10)(c), a 
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes 
underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured 
motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy 
under which he is a named insured. 
(b) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or 
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person 
for any one accident. 
(c) If a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or while occupying or 
using a vehicle not described in Subsection (10)(a) and is covered by more 
than one policy including underinsured motorist coverage, the injured 
person may elect the policy under which he collects underinsured motorist 
benefits. An injured person is not barred against making subsequent 
elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
Higtory: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 1994, ch. 316, 
1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 157; § 15. 
87, ch. 162, § 1; L. 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
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ment by ch. 1, effective January 30, 1992, The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, 
substituted the present code citation in Subsec- added "or using" in Subsection (l)(c) and in 
tion (4)(c)(ii) for "Section 41-1-1" and made present Subsections (10)(a) and (c), substituted 
stylistic changes. "covered person" for "occupant" in Subsection 
The 1992 amendment by ch. 132, effective (4)(b)(i), deleted the (a) designation in Subsec-
January 1, 1993, added the subsection designa- tion (6), deleted former Subsections (6)(b) and 
tions in Subsections (2)(a), (2Xc), and (4Kb); (c) which permitted election of insurance poli-
inserted "or under-insured" in Subsection (l)(d); cies, added Subsection (7), and made stylistic 
substituted "$25,000" for "$20,000" in Subsec- and designation changes, 
tion (4Kb); substituted "41-la-102" for "41-1-1" The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
in Subsection (4)(c)(ii); added Subsections (7) added Subsection (8)(b)(i) and the (8)(b)(ii) des-
through (9); and made stylistic changes ignation and made related and other stylistic 
throughout. changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Ci t ed in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Automobile uninsured motorist sured or underinsured motorists, 2 A.L.R.5th 
coverage: "legally entitled to recover" clause as 922. 
barring claim compensable under workers' Insured's recovery of uninsured motorist's 
compensation statute, 82 A.L.R.4th 1096. claim against insurer as affecting subsequent 
"Excess" or "umbrella" insurance policy as recovery against tortfeasors causing injury, 3 
providing coverage for accidents with unin- A.L.R.5th 746. 
31A-22-307, Personal injury protection coverages and 
benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, 
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, 
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of$250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and 
loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the 
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the 
date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a 
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured 
person would have performed for his household, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury 
unless the person's inability to perform these services continues for 
more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 
per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, 
in the total of $3,000. 
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided 
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commis-
sioner shall conduct a relative value study of services and accommodations 
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ADDENDUM C: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305 
(10)(C)(i)(b)(1995) 
(R. 36-37). 
General Session - 1995 Ch. 294 
CHAPTER 294 
H. B. 218 
Passed February 28. 1995 
Approved March 20. 1995 
Effective May 1. 1995 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
AMENDMENTS 
Sponsor- John L. Valentine 
AN ACT RELATING TO INSURANCE; 
EXPANDING THE UNINSURED AND 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
AVAILABLE TO CERTAIN PERSONS; 
DESIGNATING CERTAIN PRIMARY AND 
SECONDARY COVERAGES; AND MAKING 
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
31A-22-305, as last amended by Chapter 316, 
Laws of Utah 1994 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Sect ion 1. Sect ion 31A-22-305 is amended 
to read: 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and under insured 
motorist coverage . 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" 
includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are 
residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in the 
same household but temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer; 
and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages 
against the owner or operator of the uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 
toor death of persons under Subsection (lKa),(b),or 
(c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor 
vehicle" includes: 
<a> <i> a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or 
use of which is not covered under a liability policy at 
the time of an injury-causing occurrence: or 
<ii t 'Aia vehicle covered with lower liability limits 
than required by Section 31A-22-304; 
' B> the vehicle described in Subsection 
'2»«ai'ii »<A> is uninsured to the extent of the 
deficiency: 
>b>an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an 
accident proximately caused by the vehicle 
operator; or 
<c> h") an insured vehicle if. before or after the 
accident, the liability insurer of the vehicle is 
declared insolvent by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; 
<ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2McHi* is 
uninsured only to the extent that the claim against 
the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty 
association or fund. 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under 
Subsection 3 lA-22-302( 1)(b) provides coverage for 
covered persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death in limits that at least equal the 
minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle 
liability policies under Section 31A-22-304. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), the 
named insured may reject uninsured motorist 
coverage by an express writing to the insurer that 
provides liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302( lXa). This rejection continues for that 
issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in 
writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from 
that liability insurer. 
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, 
that are engaged in the business of, or that accept 
payment for, transporting natural persons by motor 
vehicle, and all school districts that provide 
transportation services for their students, shall 
provide coverage for all vehicles used for that 
purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by 
self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at 
least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other 
insurance covering an injured covered person. 
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee, 
who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose 
exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, 
Workers' Compensation. 
(c) As used in this subsection: 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning 
as under Section 63-30-2 . 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as 
under Section 41 - l a -102 . 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an 
uninsured motor vehicle under Subsection (2Kb) 
proximately caused an accident without touching 
the covered person or the vehicle occupied by the 
covered person, the covered person must show the 
existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear 
andconvincingevidenceconsistingof more than the 
covered person's testimony. 
«6M a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an 
injured person for any one accident. 
1
 b H j > Subsection < a > applies to all persons except a 
covered person as defined under Subsection 
t7"b"ii>, 
< ii > A covered person as defined under Subsection 
f7wbwii) is entitled to the highest limits of 
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uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any <>r 1 «• 
vehicle that the covered person is the named 
insured or an insured family member. 
'iii> This coverage shall be in addition to the 
coverage on the vehicle the covered person is 
occupying 
'iv> Neither the primary nor the secondary 
coverage may be set off against the other. 
(c> Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the 
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and 
the coverage elected by a person described under 
Subsections (lHa) and fb) shall be secondary 
coverage. 
17) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this 
section applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or 
death of covered persons while occupying or using a 
motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described 
in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the 
motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement 
vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. 
Except as provided in Subsection (6) or '-**)], a 
covered person injured in a vehicle desc* in a 
policy that includes uninsured motorist 'lefits 
may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage 
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance 
policy under which he is a covered person. 
(b) [The! Each of the following [individuals! 
persons may a\so recover uninsured motorist 
benefits under any other policy in which they are 
described as a "covered person" as defined in 
Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an 
uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, 
furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
covered person, [his] the covered person's resident 
spouse, or [a! the covered person's resident relative 
[of the covered peroon j . 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7Xb) is not 
barred against making subsequent elections if 
recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured 
motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, the operation, 
maintenance, or use of which is covered under a 
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing 
occurrence, but which has insufficient liability 
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for 
all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does 
not include: 
M) a motor vehicle that is covered under the 
liability coverage of the same policy tha t also 
contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
Hi) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in 
Subsection (2). 
<9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302(lKc) provides coverage for 
covered persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of underinsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death in limits of at least $10,000 for one 
person in any one accident, and at least $20,000 for 
two or more persons in any one accident. 
\b s The TiaiTifcti Ynsvu^d's \*TkdfcT\TkS\iTfcd mottmst 
coverage, as described in Subsection (9>(a>. is 
secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as 
described in Subsection (8). Underinsured motorist 
coverage may not be set off against the liability 
coverage of the owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, 
combined with, or stacked upon the liability 
coverage of the owner or operator of the 
underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit 
of coverage available to the injured person. 
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after 
January 1, 1993, a named insured may reject 
underinsured motorist coverage by an express 
writing to the insurer tha t provides liability 
coverage under Subjection 31A-22-302 (lXa). This 
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability 
coverage until the insured in writing requests 
underinsured motorist coverage from tha t liability 
insurer. 
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal 
notices sent after January 1, 1993, for policies 
existing on t h a t da te , the insurer shall notify the 
insured of the availability of underinsured motorist 
coverage along with estimated ranges of premiums 
for the coverage. The department shall provide 
s tandard language to be used by insurers to fulfill 
the insurers ' duty under this subsection. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under 
this section applies to bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death of an insured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or 
available for the regular use of the insured, a 
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, 
only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy 
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle 
is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered 
under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in 
Subsection (10)[te)l, a covered person injured in a 
vehicle described in a policy tha t includes 
underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to 
collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits 
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy 
under which he is a named insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured 
motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles 
may not be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available 
to an injured person for any one accident. 
(ii) Subsection (bKi) applies to all persons except a 
covered person as defined under Subsection 
(cXiXB). 
(Hi) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the 
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and 
the coverage elected by a person described under 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary 
coverage. 
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(c) (i) Each of the following persons may also 
recover underinsured motorist coverage benefits 
under any other policy in which they are described 
as a "covered person" as defined under Subsection 
111: 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an 
underinsured motor vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, 
furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
covered person, the covered persons resident 
spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a 
secondary source of coverage. 
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection 
(c)(i)(B) is entitled to the highest limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any 
one vehicle that the covered person is the named 
insured or an insured family member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the 
coverage on the vehicle the covered person is 
occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary 
coverage may be set off against the other. 
[(c) If a named insured is injured as a pedestrian 
or while occupying^or using a vehicle not described 
in Subsection (lOXa) and is covered by more than 
one—policy—including—underinsured—motorist 
coverage, the injured person may elect the policy 
under which ho collects underinsured motorist 
benefits. An] (d) A covered injured person is not 
barred against making subsequent elections if 
recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
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ADDENDUM D: 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, NON-ASSESSABLE MOTOR 
VEHICLE AND AUTO POLICY, 
COVER AND PART C2. (R.60-61.) 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy 
UTAH 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in the State of Utah. 
Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that it provides. You may call the company to help and 
assist you in any questions that you have. 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
545 East Third South 
P. O. Box 11869 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named in the 
Declarations and Policy. 
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PART C2 - UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered 
person, as defined in this part is legally entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death: 
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and 
2. caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
underinsured motor vehicle. 
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought 
without our written consent is not binding on us. 
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" means a Land Motor 
Vehicle or Trailer of any Type: 
1. The ownership, maintenance or use of which is 
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the 
time of the accident; but 
a. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability 
are insufficient to compensate fully the insured 
for all special and general damages; 
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other 
than the insured to less than the amount of the 
insured's damages. 
However, "Underinsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include 
any Vehicle or Equipment: 
1. Owned by, furnished or available for the regular use 
of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative of 
the insured, unless the motor vehicle is described in 
the Declarations and for which a specific premium 
has been paid, or if the motor vehicle is a newly 
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the 
terms of the policy; 
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
applicable motor vehicle law; 
3. Owned by any governmental unit, political 
subdivision or agency; 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads; 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on 
public roads; 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises; 
7. Defined as more fully set forth in Part CI, Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage in your policy; 
8. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but its limit for 
bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit 
for bodily injury liability specified by the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act; 
9. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or 
insuring company: 
a. denies coverage; or 
b. is or becomes insolvent. 
Definitions 
As used in this section "covered persons" includes: 
a. the named insured; 
b. persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents 
of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household 
but temporarily live elsewhere; 
c. any person occupying a covered motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy; 
All other definitions apply. 
Exclusions 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for 
bodily injury sustained by any person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor 
vehicle owned by you or any family member which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. 
This includes a trailer of any type used with that 
vehicle. 
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent 
from the Company, settles with any person or 
organization who may be liable for bodily injury. 
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is 
being used to carry persons or property for a fee. 
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense 
car pool. 
4. Use of a vehicle without permission, or the use with 
permission is beyond the consent of you or your 
spouse. 
B. There is no coverage until the limits of liability of all 
bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply have 
been used up by payment of judgments or settlements to 
other persons. 
Limits of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
person" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by 
any one person in any one accident. Subject to this limit for 
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations 
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for "each accident" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our 
maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury 
resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
a. covered Persons 
b. claims made 
c. vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations 
d. vehicles involved in the accident. 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this 
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because 
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
payable for any one vehicle under the policy with 
the highest possible dollar limit; 
b. subject to paragraph a, above, any insurance we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own 
shall be excess over any other collectible 
insurance; 
c. we will pay our share of the loss. Our share is 
the proportion of damages that the limit of 
liability of this coverage bears to the total 
applicable underinsured motorist limits. 
No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or 
any similar insurance. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
1. A covered person injured in a vehicle described in an 
insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist 
benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle 
insurance policy under which he is a named insured 
except: 
a. if a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or 
while occupying a vehicle not described in this 
part, (C2, Underinsured Motorist Coverage) and 
is covered by more than one policy including 
underinsured motorist coverage, the injured 
person may elect the policy under which he 
collects underinsured motorist benefits. 
2. The limits of liability for underinsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident. 
3. If there is other applicable or similar insurance under 
more than one insurance policy or provision of 
coverage: 
a. the maximum recovery under all policies 
combined will not exceed the maximum amount 
Fault, Amount and Arbitration 
The following two questions for the coverage under 
underinsured motorist protection must be decided by agreement 
pursuant to the provisions of the policy as follows: 
1. is the insured legally entitled to collect for bodily 
injury for damages from the owner or driver of an 
underinsured motor vehicle; and 
2. if so, in what amount? 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover 
damages under this part; or 
2. as to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for the matters to be 
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and 
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the 
arbitration rules of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of 
which is available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration 
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and 
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper 
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the 
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code 
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and 
effect in Utah at the time. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of Brief of Appellee Bear River Mutual 
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